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You know, it was always like that: the French, the Germans, the 
Swedes, they all went through the Belarusians, back and forth, 
pushing us, pressing us, kicking us. One day Russia includes us in 
its empire, another day—Rzeczpospolita, and so on; plus all those 
permanent wars that went for years. . . . So all that shaped us in 
such a way . . . you know, so that we have to think, always to think.
—aleksandr lukashenko, 2005
To describe the timing of a past event, Belarusians would usu-
ally say that it happened “under [ pri] the Poles,” or “under the 
Germans,” or “under the Soviets.” The mother tongue contains 
no categories marking the people’s independent existence in their 
own land.
—valiantsin akudovich, 2008
History is rarely predictable in the world of postsocialism. Historical in-
stitutions are even less so. Things that were taken for granted for decades 
might lose their credibility overnight. And regain it few years later. His-
torical fi gures quickly become national stars and—just as quickly—fall into 
complete oblivion. For the last two decades, postsocialism has been driven 
by a desire to build a market economy and political democracy, just as much 
as it has been an attempt to work through a complex and contradictory his-
tory of the socialist experience. Couched in a language of occupation, new 
national histories and commemorative rituals are frequently motivated by 
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the desire to draw a clear line between the “Soviet” and the “national” to re-
claim sources of authenticity outside the discursive realm of state socialism.1
Often, these histories and rituals of commemoration are grafted onto the 
material legacy of the recent past. Important locations are recaptured, re-
named, or even repurposed. Yet these acts of spatial reappropriation fre-
quently do very little to change the syntax or even the vocabulary of places 
that persist in “speaking Bolshevik.”2 What strategies of signifi cation, sym-
bolic recycling, or both can be used in regard to such structures? When 
demolition is not feasible, when stylistic gutting or retrofi tting of the inher-
ited historical forms is not possible, how, then, can the hardscape of state 
socialism be incorporated into nonsocialist or even antisocialist discursive 
frames? In this essay, I take a close look at public debates associated with 
two historical sites in Belarus.3 One is the Khatyn’ Memorial built near 
Minsk in the 1960s to commemorate the victims of the war that is usually 
described in Russian as “the Great Patriotic War” and is meant to single 
out the period of the Second World War (1941–45) when the USSR and 
Hitler’s Germany were directly fi ghting with each other. Just like the Rus-
sian Katyn, the place of mass executions of Polish prisoners by the Soviet 
secret service in 1940, the Belarusian Khatyn’ is also a killing site. A crucial 
part of the Soviet narrative about the atrocities of the war with fascism, 
Khatyn’ became an object of heated discussions in Belarus during and after 
the collapse of the USSR. The other place is the Kuropaty grave site, on the 
outskirts of the Belarusian capital. Discovered in 1988, Kuropaty contains 
the bodies of people executed in 1937–41. In the end of the 1980s through 
the early 1990s, the emerging anti- Stalinist and, eventually, anti- Soviet 
movements turned the grave site into their crucial emblem.
Since perestroika, intense historical and political discussions about the 
signifi cance of these two locations have had a considerable impact on the 
process of national identifi cation in Belarus. Remarkably, though, this in-
tensive “memory work” did not produce a narrative that could unite the 
 nation- in- the- making. No new national history emerged; no positive val-
ues were articulated. Instead, two martyrological projects compete with 
each other, trying to present one of “the regimes of occupation” (Stalin’s or 
Hitler’s) as the nation’s ultimate enemy. I suggest that this martyrological 
perception of the recent past is crucial for understanding the ways through 
which memory and history are deployed now in former socialist states. Re-
membrance and commemoration are aimed not so much at rescuing people 
and events from oblivion. Rather, these mnemonic practices are structured 
by a desire to contain and distance the traumatic past.
The two debates that I will discuss reveal a key problem with writ-
ing new (postcolonial) histories after Communism: the drive to equate the 
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“Soviet” with the “colonial,” as Maria Todorova astutely pointed out, “often 
serves as a cover for the perpetual lament of self- victimization.”4 In this 
essay, I will approach such laments seriously—as a particular symptom of 
a new form of postcoloniality that is taking shape in former Soviet space. 
As a form of historical critique, post- Soviet postcoloniality is less preoc-
cupied with uncovering sources of subaltern agency within the structures of 
domination that became so characteristic of postcolonial studies of South 
Asia.5 The paradigm of resistance is not the main driving force for post- 
Soviet postcoloniality. Instead, studies of the colonialist past are predomi-
nantly done to demonstrate the brutality of the colonizers. If anything, the 
portrayal of the colonized is used negatively—to highlight their nonpres-
ence in the history of the Soviet experiment. A potential history of Soviet 
subalternity is replaced here by a chronicle of subalternation, documenting 
successions of occupation regimes. Current accounts of past suff ering, then, 
will be read as parables of domination narrated from below, as stories about 
the “fatality of exteriority.”6 I will also attempt to demonstrate that these 
perpetual laments of self- victimization index the double nature of current 
historicist engagement with the Soviet period: retrospective discoveries of 
coloniality in the socialist past are intertwined here with discursive practices 
of postcolonial estrangement from this past.
Incinerating Memory
Our present is somebody else’s past. Our future is somebody else’s 
present.
—igar babkov, 2005
In spring 2010, during a fi eld trip to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, I spotted a small 
pin in one of the local museum shops. The bronze rectangle showed a church 
bell squeezed by two vertical columns, with a sign underneath: Khatyn’. True 
evidence of the ubiquity of Soviet agitprop, the bells of Belarusian Khatyn’ 
found their presence in the middle of Central Asia, more than two thousand 
miles away from their original location (fi gure 26). The pin was a small part 
of a major campaign of late socialism, aimed at creating a wide network of 
 spatio- symbolic memorials that would acknowledge the losses of the Great 
Patriotic War.
The last edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, published in 1969–78, 
had the following to say about Khatyn’:
Khatyn’—an architectural and sculptural memorial complex created 
on the spot of the former village of Khatyn’ (the Minsk region, the 
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Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic). It was unveiled on July 5, 1969 
to commemorate the inhabitants of the Belarusian villages and settle-
ments that were completely erased by the Fascist invaders. Simple 
sculptural forms make up a laconic architectural composition . . . im-
bued with great drama and heroic pathos.7
Pravda ’s offi  cial correspondent was more descriptive in his report from the 
unveiling ceremony:
A sculptural group erected on the spot where a village and its inhabi-
tants were incinerated: a man, shaken by the horror and pain, carries 
a teenager on his arms. This is not a scene imagined by an artist. The 
sculptor S. Selikhanov depicted a real episode of the Khatyn’ tragedy, 
when, wounded and bleeding, Iosif Kaminskii rescued from the fi re 
his dying son, who had been shot by a bullet [fi gure 27]. Miraculously, 
Iosif survived and now he stands next to me, facing the spot where 
his house used to be. In front of us, there is a symbolic chimney, the 
remains of the burned down house. The top of the chimney has a 
bell; periodically it rings disturbingly. Iosif looks up at the bell and 
drops, as if unwillingly: “They ring and ring; but nobody will come 
back.” Yes, they will never come back; those who were killed twice by 
the Fascists—fi rst with guns, then, again, with the fi re. But the bells 
of Khatyn’ ring not to resurrect the dead. Instead, they appeal to the 
survivors and their successors: “Be vigilant. Preserve the peace!”8
Figure 26. The Bells of Khatyn’, a metal pin commemorating the victims of the Khatyn’ 
massacre. Photograph by Serguei Oushakine, Bishkek, 2010.
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The Khatyn’ Memorial was an emblematic example of a quick and remark-
ably successful memorialization campaign that the Soviet government 
started in the mid- 1960s. On April 26, 1965, Pravda published a landmark 
decision that signifi ed a radical change of the attitude toward the Great Pa-
triotic War. Without any additional explanation, a concise ukaz of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR simply announced that “from 
now on” (vpred’ ) May 9 shall be “a nonworking day” reserved to celebrate 
the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.9 Restoring the 
Figure 27. The Unvanquished Man, the Khatyn’ Memorial complex, architects Yu. 
Gradov, V. Zankovich, and L. Levin; sculptor S. Selikhanov. Courtesy of Elena Baraban.
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situation that existed from 1945 to 1948, this decision signifi cantly infl u-
enced the remaining  twenty- fi ve years of the USSR’s history. The offi  cial 
holiday became a temporal anchor around which a broad network of me-
morial complexes was created around the country. Within a very short time, 
this combination of a specifi cally designated day and specifi cally created 
spatial settings produced a variety of new Soviet rituals and forms of aff ec-
tive exchange associated with the Great Patriotic War.
Khatyn’ was an integral part of this process. Already in December 
1965, following the dominant trend, the Belarusian Ministry of Culture 
drafted an extended program for “the perpetuation [uvekovechivanie] of the 
memory of fallen warriors, partisans, and victims of Fascism” in Belorussia. 
Within three weeks, the program was approved by the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of Belorussia.10 On March 3, 1966, the ruling 
board of the Union of Belarusian Architects announced an invited compe-
tition for a series of memorial projects (potential participants were given 
three weeks to create and submit their drafts of monuments).11 To empha-
size the restorative and historical aspect of the memorial in Khatyn’, offi  cial 
documents initially described the future complex as “a  museum- preserve” 
(muzei- zapovednik).12 The winning project fully responded to this vision. 
Designed by a group of young architects from Minsk, the initial proposal 
grew out of the landscape of the “former village.”13 Surrounded by a for-
est, the original Khatyn’ was populated by 153 residents. The village’s three 
short streets were made up by  twenty- six houses, four wells, and several 
barns and woodsheds used for storing hay and keeping animals. In one 
of these barns, 149 residents of Khatyn’ were shot and then burned (some 
alive) on March 22, 1943.14 A few days later, residents from a neighboring 
village buried the bodies on the edge of the forest.
Preserving the historical plan of the village, the authors of the memorial 
decided to restore the traces of the main structures, fortifying them with 
concrete. Yurii Gradov, a member of the architect team, recollected: “We 
changed nothing whatsoever in the outline of the [burned down] village. 
All the houses stayed where they were.”15 Leonid Levin, the leader of the 
team, in his recent book also insisted that the landscape of the village (trees 
included) was “left untouched” (netronutyi ).16
Nonetheless, the architects decided to add to each footprint of the 
burned houses two identical symbolic elements: a concrete gate and a con-
crete chimney with a bell on the top (fi gure 29). Each chimney carried a 
plaque with the names of inhabitants who lived in the house. Perhaps, the 
most striking “documentary” element of the memorial was a six- meter- tall 
expressionistic sculpture of The Unvanquished Man (Nepokorennyi chelovek). 
The features of The Unvanquished Man resembled those of Iosif Kaminskii, 
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the only adult witness of the Khatyn’ tragedy.17 Soon after the opening of 
the memorial, Kaminskii would even resettle in one of the houses not far 
away from the museum’s campus. Until his death in 1973, he would often 
accompany offi  cial tour guides, off ering visitors his account of the events 
that happened at the site.18
As Leonid Levin explained retrospectively, the complex initially was sup-
posed to convey just that: a historically conscious attempt to commemorate 
a village that vanished during the war. Yet, the documentary status of the 
 museum- preserve did not last for too long. In late December 1968, Belo-
russia celebrated its fi ftieth anniversary, and a large group of party leaders 
from Soviet republics was taken to the “unoffi  cial” opening of the memorial. 
Impressed by the memorial, Piotr Masherov, the head of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, decided to radically change 
its scale and persuaded the team of architects to start working on a “sec-
ond phase” of the memorial, which would “convey the tragedy of the entire 
Belarusian people through the tragedy of Khatyn’.”19 As a result, the “memorial-
 document” quickly evolved into a vast  spatio- symbolic ensemble that now 
occupies  seventy- fi ve acres and includes several  large- scale structures.20
Figure 28. A road sign pointing to the Khatyn’ Memorial, Khatyn’. Photograph by Yuri 
Baidakov. Courtesy of the author (http://darriuss. livejournal.com).
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In response to this new task, the architects supplemented the documen-
tary features of the complex with several metaphorical elements, creating 
a powerful emotional eff ect. Next to the grave of the residents of Khatyn’, 
a new complex arose: an unprecedented “cemetery of villages,” contain-
ing 185 “graves” of settlements that, like Khatyn’, were incinerated along 
with their citizens and were never rebuilt. Each “grave” contains a cap-
sule with “ashes” brought from the former settlement (fi gure 30). Next to 
these uniformly repeated headstones for the “killed villages,” the architects 
placed several metal trees that listed 433 “villages that were resurrected” 
after being completely destroyed during the war. Nearby, a 225- foot-
 long Wall of Sorrow exhibited  sixty- six names of major concentration 
camps and killing sites (out of 260 total) that existed in Belorussia during 
the war.
In the middle of a forest, removed from distracting urban noises, the 
memorial does succeed in forcing its visitors to pause and contemplate the 
fate of the village, and, by extension, the fate of the Belarusian people. Pro-
viding a contextual link, specially designed signs remind the visitors that 
Figure 29. An outline of a burned house re- created by artists, the Khatyn’ 
Memorial complex. Photograph by Yuri Baidakov. Courtesy of the author (http://
darriuss. livejournal.com).
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Khatyn’ was only the most emblematic example of a more comprehensive 
policy of “scorched earth” (vyzhzhenoi zemli ). As the composition of the 
memorial’s eternal fl ame vividly indicates, “every fourth” Belarusian was 
killed during the three years of occupation (2.2 million people altogether).21
In the early 1970s, along with a handful of complexes such as Mamaev 
Hill in Volgograd and the Brest Fortress in Brest, the Khatyn’ ensemble 
became a major Soviet memorial to the losses of the war. Fifty kilometers 
from Minsk, the Khatyn’ Memorial was also turned into a key destina-
tion (fi gure 28). Richard Nixon went there; Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat 
visited the place, too.22 From 1969 to 1993, more than  thirty- three million 
people saw the place. In 1988, the memorial probably had the highest at-
tendance in its history—two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
1.7 million people visited Khatyn’.23
Infl ated as these offi  cial numbers might be, they do refl ect the promi-
nent role of the Khatyn’ Memorial within the cultural industry of war me-
morialization in the USSR. Rewarded in 1970 with the Lenin Prize, the 
highest state award, the place was a source of inspiration for multiple songs, 
poems, novels, fi lms, a symphonic oratorio, a vocal cantata, and so on.
Figure 30. The Cemetery of Incinerated Villages, the Khatyn’ Memorial complex. 
Photograph by Elena Baraban. Courtesy of the author.
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The site’s (and memorial’s) reputation as a major document of the war’s 
atrocities reached its apex when Ales’ Adamovich, a former partisan and a 
famous Belarusian writer, published two books motivated by the Khatyn’ 
tragedy. His Khatyn’ (1971) presented a semi- fi ctionalized account of the 
war through the eyes of a teenager who gradually loses his sight after the 
trauma of Khatyn’.24 Adamovich’s second, coauthored, volume, I Am from 
a Fire Village . . . (1977), solidifi ed the evidentiary status of Khatyn’ even 
more. The book presented a collection of interviews with people whose 
settlements, like Khatyn’, were burned down during the war. Quite unusu-
ally for the time, the book was accompanied by two small audio discs with 
excerpts from accounts of eyewitnesses recorded by Adamovich and his 
colleagues.
Containing shocking pictures of atrocities, suff ering, and survival, both 
books presented the war as a nightmare whose overall scope is doomed to 
remain incomprehensible but whose horrifi c impact, nonetheless, could be 
felt through details that stuck forever in people’s memories. One of the 
respondents, Ivan Savitskii, for instance, recalled how his village of Zbyshin 
was burned down by the German troops. Unlike his sister and his father, he 
and his mother managed to escape the worst; they returned to the smoking 
village the next day:
My mother started looking for her daughter, my sister. I managed to 
hold myself together when I was burying my father, but when we got 
to the place where the women were burned to death, I was about to 
lose it; I was on a verge of collapse. . . . I said, “Let’s stop searching.” 
And we went to the place where the men were burned to death. What 
I remembered for the rest of my life was my cousin’s son. There was a 
barn, so he hid in the barn’s empty oven, and was burned there. And 
his legs were sticking out, charred. . . .  Twenty- fi ve relatives of mine 
were killed on that day. And two hundred ninety- six people altogether, 
in Zbyshin.25
Another witness, a woman, also recalled an episode from what Adam-
ovich termed later the “incinerating [ispepeliaiushchaia] memory” of the 
war: “My neighbor saw Germans encircling the village and heard somebody 
crying, ‘They will kill us, too!’ Suddenly she asked her  eight- year- old son: 
‘Sonny, why did you put these rubber shoes on? Your feet would smolder 
forever. In rubber shoes.’ ”26
By focusing almost exclusively on the ethnography of everyday atroci-
ties, Adamovich in the end placed the Khatyn’ tragedy within a global ge-
ography of war violence: “Buchenwalds, Khatyns, and Hiroshimas.”27 Or 
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slightly diff erently: Songmi [My Lai] in Vietnam, Lidice in Czechoslova-
kia,  Oradour- sur- Glane in France, and Khatyn’, “hundreds and hundreds 
of Khatyns.”28
This striving to multiply and, by multiplying, to replace the specifi city of 
a particular historical experience with its topological qualities is important. 
As Adamovich seemed to suggest, the specifi c genealogy of a particular 
act of violence—signifi cant as it is—could neither justify nor explain what 
happened. The project, in other words, was less driven by a desire to collect 
historical evidence. Instead, narratives were perceived as fragments of a large 
epic about the brutality of war. Equated by death, all these sites were seen 
as documenting the repetition of the same basic story about one group of 
human beings purposefully exterminating another.
It was this version and vision of the Khatyn’ tragedy that became canoni-
cal in the 1970s, entering popular memory and mass culture, propagandistic 
clichés and academic discourses. Streamlined and simplifi ed, the basic nar-
rative was eventually boiled down to a few unproblematic lines like these: 
“Khatyn’ was a Belarusian village. In 1943, the Germans rounded up all the 
residents of the village—including the children—into a wooden barn and 
burned them to death.”29 History, as it turned out, was much more complex.
On November 10, 1990, in the midst of glasnost revelations, Rabochaia 
Tribuna, a major Moscow newspaper, published the article “The Unknown 
Khatyn’ ” on its front page. The subtitle promised a sensation: “Only to-
day can we say it: the Belarusian village was burned down by Bandera’s 
supporters [banderovtsy] and the fascists.”30 Using testimonies of a closed 
military trial that took place in 1986 in Minsk, the author of the article 
convincingly demonstrated that the famous tragedy was organized and 
implemented by the Special 118th Punitive (karatelnyi ) Battalion, one of 
the police formations that were created by the Nazis in the occupied ter-
ritories. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 118 consisted mostly of Ukrainians; 
but it also included Russians and Belarusians. Some had served in the Red 
Army and joined the Nazis after being taken prisoner in the very beginning 
of the war; others enlisted voluntarily for political or opportunistic reasons. 
Schutzmannschaft Battalion 118 had a double leadership: the German Ma-
jor Erich Körner was in charge, while the Ukrainian Grigorii Vasiura, the 
battalion’s chief of staff , supervised the battalion on a daily basis. Formed in 
Kiev, the battalion included about fi ve hundred soldiers who were used ini-
tially in Ukraine and were transferred to Belorussia in early 1943.31 Along 
with the Khatyn’ massacre, the 118th Battalion took part in a series of an-
tipartisan “pacifi cation” operations in Belorussia, until it retreated with the 
Nazi troops in 1944.32
At the time of its publication, this radical revision of the canonical story 
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got somewhat lost in the midst of more pressing reports about the after-
math of the Chernobyl disaster, news about the recently unifi ed Germany, 
and information about the collapsing Soviet economy. Yet, the topic, sanc-
tioned by the Moscow newspaper, was quickly picked up in Minsk. In less 
than two weeks, Vo slavu Rodiny, a Belarusian newspaper published by the 
Ministry of Defense, printed an interview with Viktor Glazkov, a retired 
lieutenant colonel, who had presided over the 1986 military trial. The publi-
cation was titled affi  rmatively “Khatyn’ Was Burned by Polizeis.”33 Refuting 
the link between the 118th Punitive Squad and Stepan Bandera, a leader 
of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Glazkov put it plainly: “The truth 
is: Khatyn’ was destroyed not by Germans but by the 118th punitive battal-
ion. . . . Yes, these traitors were fascists. The atrocities that they committed 
had no limits. These people cannot be forgiven. But they were born and they 
grew up in our own country; they were brought up by our land. This is a fact, 
irrefutable and undeniable. A fact we have to accept.”34
It is precisely the acceptance of the fact that the village was incinerated 
by “our own compatriots” (nashi s vami sootechestvenniki ), as one newspaper 
put it, that proved to be very diffi  cult.35 A  clear- cut story about German 
invaders and the Belarusian popular resistance was gradually turning into a 
messy narrative about a civil war, in which relatives were split between parti-
zany and polizeis, and neighbors switched sides almost on an hourly basis.36 
Increasingly, what happened in (mostly Catholic) Khatyn’ was looking more 
and more like the pogrom in the village of  Jedwabne (Poland), where Polish 
residents murdered three hundred Jewish neighbors on July 10, 1941, soon 
after the Nazis established their control over the territory.37
The interview with Glazkov and a subsequent stream of publications 
revealed another puzzling fact. While ordinary Soviet citizens might have 
had no clue about the actual perpetrators of the Khatyn’ massacre, this was 
hardly a secret for the professionals from the KGB, the Ministry of the 
Interior, and the Ministry of  Justice. Documents from the archive of the 
Belarusian KGB, for instance, demonstrate that as early as April 1961 (at 
least four years before the decision to memorialize Khatyn’ was made), the 
republican KGB had investigated cases of collaboration between the lo-
cals and the Nazis, interrogating several members of the 118th Battalion 
who participated in the destruction of Khatyn’. F. F. Graborovsky, a former 
member of the punitive squad, disclosed during his interrogation in Au-
gust 1961:
We arrived at Khatyn’. We rounded up all the residents who did not 
manage to escape, and pushed them down to a barn of sorts. Whose 
barn it was, I have no idea. I do not remember how many people I 
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personally brought to this barn but I know that I rounded up a few 
families several times. When all the villagers were collected by the barn, 
we pushed them into the barn, and then shot them down on the order 
of the Germans. I had a rifl e, so I also shot at the barn. After the kill-
ing of the citizens in the barn, the barn with corpses and the rest of 
the village were set on fi re. I do not remember who started the fi re. . . . 
I do not remember anyone escaping the barn.38
In 1973–75 more members of the battalion were put on trial in Belorus-
sia, and, fi nally, in 1986, the KGB arrested Grigorii Vasiura, the chief of staff  
of the 118th Battalion, and brought him to Minsk. Until then, Vasiura had 
lived as a successful member of the Soviet nomenklatura in a small Ukrai-
nian town, even serving as an honorary cadet in a Kiev military school.39
Given this—well- documented—history, it is hard to explain (and to 
understand) now why Khatyn’ was selected as the emblematic site for the 
perpetuation of the losses of the war. Anna Van’kevich, a historian from 
the Belarusian Museum of the Great Patriotic War, who was charged with 
preparing background materials for the memorial complex, put it simply: 
“In 1966, when the decision to commemorate Khatyn’ as a symbol of the 
villages destroyed in Belorussia was made, we knew very little about the 
place.”40 Viktor Glazkov, who presided over the Vasiura trial in 1986, ex-
plained that publications about the involvement of Grigorii Vasiura in par-
ticular and the 118th Punitive Squad in general were blocked at the time by 
Vladimir Shcherbitskii and Nikolai Sliun’kov, the party leaders of Ukraine 
and Belorussia, respectively, out of the fear that this news could provoke 
interethnic confl icts between the two republics.41
Other historians and journalists insist that the very plan of the Khatyn’ 
Memorial from the very beginning was supposed to be a  large- scale decep-
tion. Pointing to the phonetic resemblance between Khatyn’ and Katyn, the 
supporters of this version have maintained that the tragedy of the Bela-
rusian village was used to defl ect attention from the massacre of Polish sol-
diers and offi  cers conducted in 1940 by the NKVD in the Katyn forest not 
far away from the city of Smolensk (Russia).42 Plausible as it might be, this 
version, however, lacks any evidentiary basis and relies almost completely on 
the phonetic parallelism and negative evidence.43
Perhaps, the true history of the Khatyn’ Memorial will never be known. 
Yet the important thing about the Khatyn’ aff air is not so much its status as 
a compromised historical document. Along with ongoing debates about the 
Stalinist legacy, discussions about Khatyn’ and its memorialization helped 
shape the colonial problematics and (post)colonial identity in contempo-
rary Belarus. More specifi cally, the debates pointed to a core dilemma of 
 serguei alex. oushakine
postcoloniality, with its radical split (if not a complete separation) between 
subjectivity and agency, between an ability to refl ect and the possibility to 
act.44 The Khatyn’ debates forced (some) Belarusian intellectuals to conduct 
a rhetorical realignment of the national history along new narrative and 
ethical lines. In the next section, I will show how this realignment resulted 
in the material production—or retrieval—of alternative sites of historical 
memory. I want to fi nish this part by demonstrating how this realignment 
has been manifested through a particular rhetoric of postcolonial estrange-
ment, through what Helmut Lethen calls in his study of  Weimar Germany 
“the regulating practice of distance.”45
The Khatyn’ controversy hardly changed the outline of the traditional 
(offi  cial) narrative about war violence and its victims. Recent guides to the 
Khatyn’ Memorial—restored and updated in 2004—continue to use the 
blanket term “fascists” to describe the perpetrators of the Khatyn’ massacre. 
The Khatyn’ revelations, however, made increasingly problematic the ex-
isting tradition of locating the accounts of suff ering and atrocities during 
the Second World War within a larger framework of the popular partisan 
resistance to the fascists. Belarusian pop culture and serious academic pub-
lications alike demonstrate the same fundamental paradigm shift: the trope 
of “resistance” is gradually being replaced by the trope of “occupation.”46 
Discursively, such a rhetorical move helps to externalize possible sources 
of violence and domination; it legitimizes the perceived lack of agency or 
moral choice, too. Valiantsin Akudovich, a leading Belarusian philosopher, 
historicizes the new ontological foundation in the following way: “For the 
Belarusians, the subaltern state [podnevol’noe sostoianie], the state of occupa-
tion became natural; with time, they got used to the foreign yoke [chuzheze-
myi gnet], as one gets used to atmospheric pressure.”47
This language of subalternity is not accidental. From the end of the 
1990s, Belarusian intellectuals have been developing their own versions of 
postcoloniality, trying to redefi ne their relationship with historical narratives 
that routinely framed their past as a part of somebody else’s history, be it 
Poland, the Russian Empire, or the USSR.48 Postcolonial studies in Belarus 
are far from homogeneous, and diff erent scholars pick diff erent key points 
in their constructions of alternative histories. Yet, it would not be a stretch 
to say that for postcolonial studies of occupation the meaning and the role 
of the Great Patriotic War have become paramount.49 Within this “mode 
of validation of conscious existence,” the war—seen from a distance—is 
conceived of as a traumatic historical experience that imposed an unhappy 
choice “between Stalin and Hitler,” as a recent fi lm about Khatyn’ framed 
it.50 This rhetorical framing makes possible the next important move: 
the problematic histories of resistance and collaboration are dismissed as 
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equally meaningless. It is the nature of occupation, not the experience of 
subjection, that becomes the site of principal intellectual investments. As a 
result, the partisan movement in Soviet Belarus is recoded as an enforced 
heroism, as an imposed form of agency that contradicted each and every 
rational calculation of the local population. Valiantsin Akudovich explains: 
“Spearheaded by Moscow, the partisan movement provoked the Germans 
to act with additional, ‘unplanned’ brutality. At the same time, this move-
ment forced the Belarusians towards . . . an unnatural, unnecessary, and, in 
the end, disastrous fi ght against the occupation. . . . Neither from a socio-
political point of view, . . . nor from the point of view of a natural drive to 
protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s kin, could the idea of the struggle 
against the occupation be perceived by the people as vitally necessary.”51 If 
earlier attempts to question reckless and dangerous aspects of the partisan 
movement ( partizanshchina) were usually framed as attempts to approach 
the history of the Great Patriotic War also as a history of a civil war within 
one nation, then current interpretations of the partisan resistance are struc-
tured by a defi nite desire to place the very fi gure of the partisan outside the 
local context.52 Postcolonial estrangement is realized as a retroactive expul-
sion. For instance, in her recent study of “the concept of the partisan,” Daria 
Sitnikova neatly juxtaposes “the Soviet” and “the Belarusian,” concluding 
that “the Belarusian national myth of partisan(ship) is, in fact, a Soviet/
imperial myth of partisanship, in which the Belarusians (as a nation) were 
to perform a subservient function as ideological fi ghters against the empire’s 
enemies.”53 Just like the fascist, the partisan becomes a sign of invasion, in 
this case—from the east.
To some extent, these structuralist interpretations of occupation repro-
duce the already familiar logic of Adamovich’s writings about Khatyn’. Back 
in the 1970s, perceiving violence only in terms of its eff ect, Adamovich also 
avoided the uneasy task of having to diff erentiate between various wars. The 
trope of “hundreds of Khatyns” was instrumental in putting aside ques-
tions of the motivation of violence or its selective application. In today’s 
Belarus, postcolonial historicists in a similar structuralist move bracket off  
specifi c circumstances that brought to life specifi c forms of the deploy-
ment of power. In this approach, the subaltern state is a reversed version 
of domination, with subjectivity understood as something eternally given, 
not contextually produced. Hence the intrinsic negativity of this type of 
postcoloniality: by and large it constitutes itself through a compulsion to 
reject forms of identity, linguistic behavior, or types of agency that are per-
ceived as imposed by outsiders. Unlike subaltern studies of South Asia, 
which aim to perceive imperial structures of domination also as a source of 
colonial agency that displaces and destabilizes these very structures from 
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within, postcolonial historicists limit their criticism mostly to the gesture 
of withdrawal from the experience that should not have happened in the 
fi rst place.54
In his study of structurally similar tendencies of social and symbolic 
disassociations in Weimar Germany, Peter Sloterdijk off ers a conceptualiza-
tion that I fi nd extremely useful for understanding the logic of postcolonial 
estrangements in contemporary Belarus. Dealing with artistic and social ex-
amples of “combatant consciousness,” Sloterdijk defi nes this  socio- symbolic 
positionality of self- evacuation as “strategic immoralism.”55 For Sloterdijk, 
this “cynical structure” is a form of social behavior and a genre of discursive 
production—a “procedural possibility” and a “poetic opportunity”—that 
enables performances of social alienation, unmasked by imaginary fantasies, 
and promises of a brighter future.56 The strategic immoralism of this kind 
of subalternity is a form of aesthetic and ethical disengagement from situ-
ations that could not be controlled and from frameworks that could not be 
changed. Not able to secure a safe location, strategic immoralism, nonethe-
less, manifests a discursive fi ssure between the structures of domination and 
those who have to embody them.
As I have tried to show, post- Soviet postcoloniality is motivated by a 
similar feeling of being beholden to a historical locality. Like Sloterdijk’s 
cynical structure, this form of postcoloniality also stems from an implicit 
recognition of the absence of other spatial alternatives, while being driven 
by a desire to experience and express a certain noncorrespondence between 
“the state of occupation” and a state that preceded the moment of radical 
alienation from one’s own history.
There is one crucial diff erence between Sloterdijk’s “functionalist cyni-
cism” and postsocialist subalternation, though.57 For Sloterdijk’s strategic 
immoralists, their “nonaffi  rmative form of affi  rmation,” their cool embrace 
of the structures they cannot avoid, was all there was.58 Distancing was 
practiced as a lack of complete identifi cation with the structures of domi-
nation, not as a form of complete self- erasure. For Belarus’s postcolonial 
historicists, their performances of discursive alienation from the structures, 
which they could not fl ee, are still wrapped in clothes of romantic national-
ism.59 Nostalgic and retrospective, the postcolonial critique is understood 
here mainly as an opportunity for the “information retrieval” of identities 
and practices of the past, which have been silenced.60 Distancing from the 
Soviet past is envisioned as a temporal escapism. To put it simply: the post-
colonial is equated here with the preimperial and precolonial, with a time 
that had no place either for polizeis, or for partisans.
The Khatyn’ aff air was helpful for reformatting the nation’s war legacy 
in postcolonial terms, but it was neither the fi rst nor the most signifi cant at-
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tempt to revisit the Soviet past. The key toponym of the postcolonial version 
of socialism—“between Stalin and Hitler”—which emerged so prominently 
during the Khatyn’ debates, was initially formulated in the late 1980s when 
mass graves were discovered on the outskirts of Minsk. With its clearly 
emphasized politics of distancing and rhetoric of detachment, the analytical 
space claimed “between Stalin and Hitler” interestingly epitomized a wide-
spread attempt to conceptualize the experience and consequences of being 
a part of the two most brutal regimes of the twentieth century. A symptom 
of the upcoming collapse of the USSR, this toponym was a form of refusal 
to be associated with either of these regimes.
By the end of the 1990s, this search for an autonomous domain, for a 
subject position, which would not be reducible to the structures of occupa-
tion (whatever this occupation might be), evolved into diverse intellectual 
debates. The initial space “between Stalin and Hitler” was reframed and 
abstracted as the “borderland space” ( pamezhzha), as ontological and epis-
temological “in- between- ness,” called upon to represent the core feature 
of the Belarusian nation.61 I want to emphasize this characteristic feature 
of post- Soviet postcoloniality: attempts to revise history along the axes of 
colonial narratives so far have not produced a clearly articulated vision of 
post- Soviet subalternity. To push it even more: instead of subalternity, with 
its Foucauldian emphasis on the simultaneity of the repressive and produc-
tive eff ects of power, we see the work of a mechanism of subalternation 
that focuses on the fi nal outcome of subordination, while leaving aside the 
internal principles and dynamics of this process.62 The Schmittian percep-
tion of politics as an ability to make a clear distinction between friend and 
enemy undergoes a radical change here: “strategic immoralism” knows no 
friend.63 Within this approach, postcolonial condition, then, is a form of 
retrospective oscillation between external sources of power and domination, 
a perpetual alternation between diff erent enemies.
No Place for Historical Truth
The Kuropaty tragedy is as big as the Khatyn’ tragedy is. It should 
and it will be thought through by generations of people. . . . Like 
the crucifi xion of Christ.
—zianon pazniak, 1994
In comparison to the Khatyn’ case, the debates associated with the killing 
site in Kuropaty were less driven by a desire to revise already existing master 
narratives. Postcolonial narratives had to be created from scratch. How-
ever, just as in the case of Khatyn’, the participants of the Kuropaty debates 
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grounded their stories, their arguments, and their commemorative practices 
in the spatial structures inherited from the past. New national narratives, in 
other words, are still inseparable from the landscape of history. Space, not 
time, continues to dominate stories about the nation’s past and future.
In October 2009, Pavel Iakubovich, the editor in chief of the main gov-
ernmental newspaper Sovetskaia Belarus, appealed to the participants of a 
roundtable gathered in the newspaper’s editorial offi  ce: “Let’s think about 
Kuropaty; but let’s do it outside the traditional and well familiar framework 
of ‘the battle of worldviews’ [mirovozzrencheskaia bitva]. It is about time for 
all of us to realize—regardless of our personal opinions—that Kuropaty is 
not a place to look for historical truth [istoricheskaia istina]! Kuropaty is a 
tragic lesson for our society.”64 The transcript of the roundtable, published 
on October 29, the day on which the Belarusian political opposition and 
human rights activists commemorate the victims of Stalinist repressions 
each year, was an unusual move on the part of the  state- run newspaper. 
For more than two decades “Kuropaty” had been a divisive issue in Be-
larus, splitting apart those who were fi rmly rooted in the Soviet past and 
those who wanted to leave this past behind. In a sense, Iakubovich’s ver-
sion of el pacto de olvido—the pact of forgetting in the name of general 
reconciliation—with its clear appeal to abandon all attempts to establish 
a fi nal and defi nite version of what happened, refl ected historical fatigue 
following twenty years of intense historical debates.65 Perhaps more im-
portant, this epistemological surrender—regardless of its actual political 
motivation—pointed to a gradual acceptance of the fact that the political 
and ethical ambiguity of the nation’s recent history could not be overcome. 
Multiple interpellations and contradictory forms of subjectivity produced 
by the past could not be streamlined. The promise of analytical autonomy 
that the space “in- between” off ered in the late 1980s had turned out to be 
illusory. Historical uncertainty and political undecidability were increas-
ingly seen as a position from which new forms of national belonging could 
be imagined and articulated. Unlike the Khatyn’ ensemble, the Kuropaty 
Memorial emerged spontaneously—as a popular attempt to remember vic-
tims of the Stalinist terror. Yet despite this diff erence, the mnemonic prac-
tices associated with these two sites demonstrate a striking affi  nity of their 
development: in both cases, the initial desire to commemorate victims was 
transformed into a persistent striving to memorialize victimhood.
The term Kuropaty entered public debates in Belorussia on June 3, 1988, 
when a local newspaper Litaratura i mastastva published an exposé written by 
Zianon Pazniak, an archaeologist and historian of theater from the History 
Division of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, and Yauhen Shmyhalou, 
an engineer with a strong passion for history.66 In their essay “Kuropaty—
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The Road of Death,” the two men described how they discovered several 
mass graves in a forest near the Minsk Ring Road in the spring of 1988. 
Zianon Pazniak insisted that he had known “subconsciously” about these 
graves since the 1970s, but could publicize the information only during the 
glasnost period.67 The graves contained skeletons and gunshot skulls as well 
as various objects: ceramic mugs, clothes, shoes, toothbrushes, combs, and 
so on. Some of the objects provided clues about the timing of the murders: 
a leather purse contained Soviet coins, with the latest dated 1936; rubber 
galoshes bore imprints of Soviet factories and a date “1937.”68 Interviews 
with residents of neighboring villages confi rmed the idea that the grave site 
emerged before the Nazis occupied Minsk in June 1941. Combining all 
their evidence, Pazniak and Shmyhalou concluded that Kuropaty (as they 
called the place) was a site of mass executions conducted by the People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Aff airs (NKVD) between 1937 and 1941, and 
suggested that the site might hide “thousands of bodies.”69
The article caused a major social explosion. In ten days, on June 14, 
1988, the Offi  ce of the Republican Prosecutor opened a criminal case, citing 
mass murders as the main reason; the Belarusian Parliament followed up 
by creating a special commission. Iazep Brolishs, appointed by the general 
prosecutor in charge of the special group of investigators, recalled later that 
the criminal case had no precedents in the Soviet history: while the crime 
scene was clearly present, it was totally unclear “who or what the investiga-
tive team should be searching for.”70
Nonetheless, during several months of searches and excavations, the in-
vestigators established that a  seventy- acre wooded area had 510 ditches, 
possibly containing the bodies of people executed before the Nazi occupa-
tion. Selective exhumations revealed the remains of 356 bodies. Objects 
found in these graves indicated that the executed were predominantly from 
Belorussia, but some were, most likely, from the Baltic region. Based on 
these data, the group suggested that the site might contain “no less” than 
thirty thousand bodies.71 None of the bodies could be identifi ed, and all ef-
forts to fi nd any documentation concerning mass executions in the archives 
of the republican KGB failed.72 In November 1988, the Offi  ce of the Gen-
eral Prosecutor closed the case, stating that the mass executions at Kuropaty 
took place “no earlier than 1933 and no later than June 1941.” The fi nal 
report provided a list of names of NKVD offi  cials of various ranks who 
were involved in mass executions. However, as the report explained, “it was 
impossible to interrogate people involved in these executions. [Because] all 
the heads of the NKVD and other offi  cials responsible for these repressions, 
either have already been executed [by the NKVD in the 1930s and 1940s] 
or are dead.”73
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Very quickly Kuropaty became a place of spontaneous pilgrimage: on 
June 19, 1988, two weeks after the initial publication of the essay, up to ten 
thousand people gathered at this previously unknown place for a “meeting- 
requiem.” Their slogans read “We’ll not forget! We’ll not forgive!” and 
“Keep alive the memory of genocide victims!”74 “Dziady- 88,” another ma-
jor march to Kuropaty on October 30, 1988, became, arguably, the fi rst mass 
Soviet demonstration that was dispelled by the police, using tear gas.75
Eventually, these spontaneous acts of commemoration gave rise to or-
ganizations that determine the political landscape of independent Belarus. 
The initial association, Martyrology of Belarus, created after the publica-
tion of the essay on Kuropaty, became a launching pad for a political orga-
nization called the Belarusian Popular Front (the BNF), a party that was 
the core of the Belarus opposition for almost two decades. As Pazniak put 
it later, “Kuropaty marked the beginning of a new political revival for Be-
larus. . . . Kuropaty marked the beginning of the collapse of communism” 
in the republic.76
In 1989, the government decided to memorialize the victims of Stalinist 
repressions at Kuropaty by establishing a monument there.77 In 1993, the 
state registered Kuropaty as a site of “historical and cultural value,” granting 
it the offi  cial status of a  landmark- memorial (“The killing fi eld of victims of 
political repressions”).78 Somewhat predictably, this national revival, which 
the BNF anchored around two major traumas—the Chernobyl disaster and 
the Kuropaty grave site—produced its own resistance. Yet the main objec-
tion was not the overall attempt to frame the national revival through the 
tropes of victimhood. It was the source of oppression, it was the cause of 
suff ering that became a subject of major disputes. The BNF’s resolute view 
that the mass murders at Kuropaty were conducted by the Soviet authorities 
incited “the battle of worldviews,” a “battle” that has been going on and off  
in Belarus ever since. War veterans and former partisans were, perhaps, the 
most vocal opposition to the anti- Stalinist reading of the grave site. With 
the Khatyn’ revelations in the background, more evidence of the fact that one 
group of compatriots executed another group of compatriots was hard to 
digest. Dismissing the decision of the governmental investigators as biased, 
they created their own independent public commission. Their search had 
some unexpected results. In August 1991, several newspapers published the 
testimony of Mikhail Pozniakov, a former partisan, who insisted that Ku-
ropaty was a killing camp created by the Nazis in August 1941 to exterminate 
Jews brought to Minsk from Poland, Austria, and Germany. Vechernii Minsk, 
the city’s major newspaper, for instance, ran a  front- page article, in which 
Pozniakov explained in detail that, as a prisoner of war, he was forced to dig 
up common graves and bury the bodies after the executions in Kuropaty.79
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Under the pressure of the independent public commission, the general 
prosecutor reopened the case and conducted two rounds of additional in-
vestigations in 1992–93. No new evidence resurfaced, and in 1995 the case 
was closed again. In its fi nal statement, the general prosecutor dismissed 
the version of the public commission by explaining that archival searches 
conducted in Israel and Germany provided no support for the idea that 
Kuropaty was used as a site for the mass extermination of  Jews.80
What I fi nd important about these opposite readings of the same site 
is the similarity of their motivation. Regardless of their concrete political 
views, both sides were interpreting the murders at Kuropaty within the 
same framework of external occupation: the enemy, the perpetrator always 
comes from the outside. Evil is always done by the other. The metonymic 
logic of this postcolonial lament produced another interpretative parallel: 
both sides agreed that Kuropaty was only the tip of a much larger political 
campaign. The language of genocide, quickly adopted by each side, located 
the Kuropaty victims within a broad master narrative about purposeful 
ethnic annihilation. “Genocide,” in other words, provided a rationalizing 
structure for understanding and normalizing murders that might have had 
no rational basis in the fi rst place.81 “Genocide” also delineates a specifi c 
subject position of this form of postcoloniality—the position of the victim, 
devoid of agency to resist/evade the regime of occupation but fully capable 
of refl ecting on its eff ects.
Despite their structural similarities, the two sides diff ered dramatically 
in their views on the subject of culpability and the status of the victim. 
Former partisans, war veterans, and their (usually Russo- phonic) support-
ers internationalized the tragedy. The dead at Kuropaty were persistently 
described as “innocent citizens” of the USSR and foreign countries who 
became “victims of the Hitler’s [gitlerovskii] genocide.”82 By and large, the 
tragedy in Kuropaty was inscribed within the framework of the familiar 
story about the Central European Holocaust.
The other side, increasing the estimated number of people buried at 
Kuropaty to 200,000–250,000, was more discriminating about the ethnic 
makeup of the victims. In this version, the location was a symbol of “the 
Russo- German  Communist- Fascist cooperative work aimed at extermi-
nating the Belarusians.”83 As Pazniak characterized it in 1991, “This geno-
cide was even bigger than the genocide conducted against the Serbs and the 
Jews. The only diff erence was—they suff ered at the hands of the fascists, 
while the Belarusians suff ered at the hands of the communists.”84 Despite 
the fact that none of the victims at Kuropaty were identifi ed, the supporters 
of this view presented the grave site as the national necropolis, where the 
best and the brightest of the Belarusians were killed en masse.85
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For a decade or so, neither side could win the battle of worldviews, in 
which Stalin’s Terror was juxtaposed to Hitler’s Holocaust. To some degree, 
the denial of prewar political terror by one group was neutralized by the 
nationalist attempt of the other to rhetorically exploit unidentifi ed bodies. 
Meanwhile, the place itself remained almost in its original condition. Com-
memorative projects were undertaken exclusively by volunteers who raised 
“crosses of suff ering” along the “road of death.”86
After 1994, during the presidency of Aleksandr Lukashenko, the polar-
izing reformatting of the past slowed down somewhat. Pazniak’s emigration 
in 1996 left the opposition with no charismatic leader able to mobilize the 
masses around a powerful national cause. By the late 1990s, the situation 
had reached a state of equilibrium of sorts: each side relied on its own evi-
dence and testimonies, and emphasized blank spots and logical gaps in the 
other side’s narratives. Therefore, the general prosecutor’s 1998 decision to 
reopen the case took many by surprise. The fourth round took about two 
years. The fi nal report in this criminal case—the last one to date—was 
never disclosed. However, in 2001, the general prosecutor’s offi  ce publi-
cized a press release that drew a line. Confi rming earlier conclusions about 
the NKVD’s involvement in mass executions, the release, at the same time, 
included several points that until then had not been a part of the standard 
offi  cial narrative about Kuropaty.
First, the release pointed out that there were accounts indicating that 
some murders “were also committed by the German occupational authori-
ties during the Patriotic war. However, these accounts could not be corrobo-
rated.” The document also confi rmed earlier statements by the prosecutor’s 
offi  ce regarding exaggerated estimates of the number of victims buried at 
Kuropaty. Citing new evidence—out of  twenty- three graves opened dur-
ing this round of investigation, only nine had human remains—the release 
stated that “the number of victims initially associated with the graves, was 
overestimated by several orders.” It did not provide new estimates, how-
ever.87 The prosecutor’s offi  ce left unexplained another major point of con-
tention. Multiple household objects and pieces of clothing found in the 
graves indicated that they were produced abroad—in Germany, Poland, 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Not taking responsibility for any fi nal inter-
pretation, the release suggested that these objects could have belonged to 
the citizens of western Belorussia as well as to those foreigners who were 
“brought over by the Germans from Europe.” Finally, the prosecutor’s offi  ce 
did not off er any ideas as to how to interpret the seemingly incongruous 
objects found in some graves such as knives, razors, gun parts, and pieces of 
equipment that could be used for producing ammunition. Without naming 
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names, the release remarked euphemistically that “lapses of this sort were 
totally uncharacteristic for the NKVD’s style of work.”88
The release did produce one major piece of new evidence, though. 
During one of the excavations, the investigators discovered prison receipts 
acknowledging the confi scation of money during the arrests. Written in 
Russian, the receipts were dated by October 1939 and June 1940. However, 
as the offi  ce of the general prosecutor clarifi ed, the names listed in the re-
ceipts—Moshe Kramer and Mordehai Shuleskis—left no criminal paper 
trail in the available state archives and therefore provided no clue for further 
investigations.89
In a sense, the general prosecutor confi rmed the status quo, leaving each 
side in a state of suspension. In its own idiosyncratic way, the prosecutor 
articulated the point that Pavel Iakubovich would formulate in 2009: “Ku-
ropaty is not a place to search for historical truth.” Commenting on the 
new decision on the case, one Belarusian weekly translated it in terms of 
postcolonial pragmatics: “In the end, it is not that important who is buried 
at Kuropaty. They were victims of repression. Let history decide whether 
these repressions were Stalin’s or Hitler’s. The most important thing is—
this is a necropolis.”90
Started as an attempt to construct a critique of Stalinism by appealing to 
the memory of the dead, the debates about commemoration of the victims 
at Kuropaty gradually transformed into an act of symbolic distancing from 
both Soviet socialism and the Nazi occupation. However, this search for a 
safe subject position, uncontaminated by the legacies of the oppressors, has 
ended (for now) with a social and discursive deadlock. Initially perceived as 
a space of relative autonomy, the space “in- between” resembles more and 
more a space of double exposure, a space for the social and symbolic confl a-
tion of contradictory historical legacies.91
To some degree, this move—from a fantasy of autonomy to the recogni-
tion of double subjection—does reproduce the intellectual trajectory of the 
subaltern studies of South Asia in the 1980s. Back then, the initial attempts 
to retrieve the silenced voices and unnoticed histories of the subalterns re-
sulted in a discouraging recognition of the basic fact that the history of the 
subalterns is the history of their repeated failures. Summarizing the fi rst 
decade of subaltern studies, Gyan Prakash, for instance, wrote in 1994, “The 
desire to recover the subaltern’s autonomy was repeatedly frustrated because 
subalternity, by defi nition, signifi es the impossibility of autonomy.”92 This 
recognition, then, produced two distinctive moves. The emphasis on the 
impossibility of subaltern authenticity forced scholars to assume “a posi-
tion of critique,” aimed at identifying “a recalcitrant diff erence that arises 
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not outside but inside elite discourses to exert pressure on forces and forms 
that subordinate it.”93 In turn, a desire to retain a more nuanced vision of 
identity pushed other scholars to construe authenticity not in ontological 
but in performative terms—for instance, as cultural practices of “validation, 
perpetuation, and aesthetic evaluation” that are not coeval with that of oc-
cupational regimes.94
While none of these positions were clearly articulated during the twenty 
years of the Kuropaty debates, the very impossibility of coming to terms 
with this location is prominent evidence of the futility of eff orts aimed at 
carving out in colonial history a space untouched by the imperial presence.
———
In this essay I have tried to follow debates about forms and sites of me-
morialization in post- Soviet Belarus. Begun during perestroika, the public 
discussions about Khatyn’ and Kuropaty eventually evolved into persistent 
attempts to realign the Soviet past along new narrative axes. Most promi-
nently, this discursive reformatting of the socialist experience was refl ected 
in various gestures of withdrawal and distancing. I have suggested that these 
discursive and mnemonic moves—from commemorating victims to memo-
rializing victimhood—could be seen as signs of the emergence and devel-
opment of postcolonial reasoning in post- Soviet Belarus. The postcolonial 
estrangement that these historicist projects have produced is a consequence 
of a utopian search for sources of authenticity outside the power structures 
imposed by “occupation regimes.” So far, this retrospective quest for a safe 
place “in- between” has resulted in a series of dead ends. Instead of bringing 
the nation together, it has polarized the society. Instead of providing an at-
tractive alternative to the moral duplicity of state socialism, it has off ered a 
historical justifi cation for ethical relativism. These deadlocks and false turns 
of postcolonial studies of socialism can be seen as refl ecting the early stage 
of this intellectual movement. Alternatively, they may signify the emer-
gence of a diff erent—conservative and nostalgic—form of postcoloniality. 
In either case, these debates helpfully outline the uneasy process of the 
retroactive creation of colonial subjectivity, demonstrating how the act of 
reclaiming an important historical place can become indistinguishable from 
being beholden to this place. More signifi cantly, though, these debates also 
allow us to perceive postsocialism not only as an operation that dismantles 
key confi gurations produced by seven decades of the Soviet way of life, but 
also as a form of intense investment in these structures, conventions, and 
forms—an investment that makes the very critique of these historical forms 
and their originary narratives possible.
postcolonial estrangements 
Notes
I would like to thank the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 
(NCEEER) for funding my fi eldwork in Minsk. I am also grateful to Elena Gapova, 
Irina Solomatina, Alexei Bratochkin, Tatiana Bembel, and other friends and col-
leagues from Minsk for their help, advice, and generosity during my stay in Belarus. 
My special thanks to Olga Gnilomiodova for her assistance with the library search. 
Earlier versions of this text were presented at Princeton University, Columbia Univer-
sity, Humboldt University of Berlin, Irkutsk State University, Miami University, New 
York University, and Johns Hopkins University; I am indebted to the participants of 
these discussions for their comments, questions, and suggestions. Julie Buckler and 
Emily D. Johnson were extremely helpful in turning this article into a publishable 
text, and I am grateful for their editorial advice and comments.
1. For more on new national historiographies, see Natsional’nye istorii na postsovets-
kom prostranstve—II. Desiat’ let spustia, ed. Falk Bomsdorf and Gennadyi Bordiugov 
(Moscow: Fond Fridrikha Naumanna, 2010).
2. Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1995).
3. Throughout the essay, I will follow the emerging tradition of using “Belorus-
sia” to describe the Soviet part of the country’s history, while retaining “Belarus” for 
referring to its independent status.
4. Maria Todorova, “Balkanism and Postcolonialism, or On the Beauty of the Air-
plane View,” in Marx’s Shadow: Knowledge, Power, and Intellectuals in Eastern Europe 
and Russia, ed. Costica Bradatan and Serguei Alex. Oushakine (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 181.
5. See Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial 
India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
6. On the fatality of exteriority, see Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphaël 
Confi ant, and Mohamed B. Taleb Khyar, “In Praise of Creoleness,” Callaloo 13, no. 4 
(Autumn 1990): 890.
7. See the entry “Khatyn’” in Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia- online, http://
www.big- soviet.ru/759/86409/%D5%E0%F2%FB%ED%FC.
8. N. Novikov, “Kholm bessmertiia,” Pravda, July 6, 1969.
9. Ukaz Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, “Ob obiavlenii 9 maia nerabo-
chim dnem,” Pravda, April 26, 1965.
10. Uvekovechivanie pamiati zashchitnikov Otechestva i zhertv voin v Belarusi. 1941–
2008 gg., ed. Vladimir Adamushko et al. (Minsk: NARB, 2008), 148–50, 150–52.
11. Khatyn’. Tragediia i pamiat’. Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Vladimir Adamushko, 
Igor Valakhanovich, and Natalia Kirillova (Minsk: Natsional’nyi arkhiv Respubliki 
Belarus’, 2009), 138–39.
12. See Uvekovechivanie pamiati, 133.
13. Mariia Eismont, “Memorial ‘Khatyn’ sozdavali tridtsatiletnie rebiata,” Narod-
naia volia, July 16, 1999.
14. See a detailed account of the event and the survivors: Elena  Kobets- Filimonova, 
Raspiataia Khatyn’ (Minsk: Bellitfond, 2005), 114–16.
15. Vladimir Padaliak, “Nizki paklon . . . ,” Golas Radzini, July 2, 2009.
16. Leonid Levin, Khatyn’. Avtobiografi cheskaia povest’ (Minsk: Asobny Dakh, 
2005), 58.
 serguei alex. oushakine
17. See Viktor Leshchenko, “Tainy Khatyni,” Narodnaia gazeta, February  20, 
2003; Alla Van’kevich, “Pravda o Khatyni,” Narodnaia gazeta, February 20, 1993.
18. Levin, Khatyn’, 46; Mariia Zalivskaia, “Vstrechu s Kaminskim ne zabyvaiu,” 
Narodnaia gazeta, June 16, 1993; P. Kosmynin, “Ia iz sozhzhennoi derevni,” Vo slavu 
Rodiny, April 2, 1992; Ludmila Selitskaiia, “Ia iz vognennai veski,” Sovetskaia Belorus-
siia, April 20, 2004.
19. Levin, Khatyn’, 92.
20. For an outline and a virtual tour, see the museum’s website: http://www.khatyn.by.
21. Khatyn’ (Minsk: Belarus, 1973). A recently published guide to the Khatyn’ Me-
morial provides the updated data: during the occupation, 209 cities and towns were 
destroyed; 9,200 villages were burned down; 2.6 million people were killed (that is, every 
third person). Natallia Kirilava, ed., Khatyn’. Khatyn. Chatyn (Minsk: Belarus, 2007), 14.
22. M. Shimanskii, “Kolokola Khatyni,” Izvestiia, September 21, 1981; Viachaslav 
Dubinka, “Daroga na Khatyn’: Natatki fotakarespandenta z khatynskikh yrazhan-
niav,” Nasha svaboda, August 6, 2002.
23. N. Kuts, “Kolokola Khatyni,” Vo slavy Rodiny, March 27, 1993.
24. The book was used as the basis for the fi lm Come and See (Mosfi lm and Belar-
usfi lm, 1985), directed by Elem Klimov. For an interview with the fi lm director, see 
Elem Klimov, “Bezdna,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 5 (2004), 86–88.
25. Ales’ Adamovich, Ianka Bryl’, and Vladimir Kolesnik, Ia iz ognennoi derevni . . . 
(Minsk: Mastaska literature, 1977), 186.
26. See Adamovich, “Cherty literatury poslednikh let,” Voprosy literatury, no. 5 
(1976): 100; Adamovich et al., Ia iz ognennoi derevni, 80.
27. Ales’ Adamovich, Khatyn’skaia povest’. O voine i mire (Moscow: Voennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1973), 186.
28. Ibid., 186, 200.
29. Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of  World 
War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 207.
30. V. Roshchin, “Neizvestnaia Khatyn’,” Rabochaia Tribuna, November 10, 1990, 
1, 4. Banderovtsy refers to the supporters of the Organization of Ukrainian National-
ists headed by Stepan Bandera. For details, see David Marples, “Stepan Bandera: The 
Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero,”  Europe- Asia Studies 58, no. 4 (2006): 
555–66.
31. Sergei Krapivin, “‘Izbytochnaia’ pravda o Khatyni,” Trud v Belarusi, March 20, 
2003.
32. For an excellent review of the history of the 118th Battalion, see Per Anders 
Rudling’s essays: “Terror and Local Collaboration in Occupied Belarus: The Case of 
the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 118. I. Background,” Historical Yearbook: Journal of 
the “Nicolae Iorga” History Institute, no. 8 (2011): 195–214; and “The Khatyn Massacre 
in Belorussia: A Historical Controversy Revisited,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 26, 
no. 1 (Spring 2012): 29–58.
33. “Polizei” ( politstai ) is normally used to refer to Soviet citizens who collabo-
rated with the Nazi regime, usually in the form of implementing close police control 
in occupied territory.
34. Vasilii Zdaniuk, “‘Khatyn’ sozhgli politsai’: Interv’iu s Viktorom Glazkovym,” 
Vo slavu Rodiny, November 20, 1990.
35. Vasilii Zdaniuk, “‘Khatyn’ sozhgli politsai’,” Svobodnye  novosti- plius, no. 12, 
March 22–29, 1996.
postcolonial estrangements 
36. For a detailed account of the Khatyn’ tragedy see  Kobets- Filimonova, Raspia-
taia Khatyn’.
37. See Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jed-
wabne, Poland (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
38. “Iz protokola doprosa obviniaemogo F. F. Graborovskogo. August 14, 1961,” in 
Khatyn’. Tragediia i pamiat’, 65. The description is almost identical to the testimony 
about the massacre of  Jews in Jedwabne quoted in Jan Gross’s Neighbors (1–7).
39. Mikhail Tokarev, “Khatynskaia tragediia. Obviniaet glavnyii svidetel’,” Vo slavu 
Rodiny, March 20, 1998; Zdaniuk, “‘Khatyn’ sozhgli politsai’,” 3; “Zdes’ ubivali luidei,” 
Sovetskaia Belarus, March 22, 2008; “Kto szheg Khatyn?” The program was aired by 
ONT (Obshenatsional’noe televidenie), Minsk, June 20, 2008.
40. Van’kevich, “Pravda o Khatyni,” 7.
41. Zdaniuk, “‘Khatyn’ sozhgli politsai.’”
42. Sergei Shapran, “Pervoe otkrovenie,” Belorusskaia delovaia gazeta, July 2, 2004. 
See also Gasan Gusseinov, D.S.P. Sovetskie ideologemy v rossiiskom diskurse 1990- kh 
(Moscow: Tri kvadrata, 2003), 73–75; Pravda Khatyni (BelSat, 2008, 35 min.); Alex-
andra Goujon, “Memorial Narratives of  WWII: Partisans and Genocide in Belarus,” 
East European Politics and Society 24, no. 1 (February 2010): 17–18.
43. In my correspondence with two active supporters of the link between Khatyn’ 
and Katyn, Igor Kuznetsov, the consultant of the fi lm Pravda Khatyni, and Gasan 
Gusseinov, a Moscow philologist, confi rmed that they had neither documentary evi-
dence corroborating this version nor any oral confi rmation of the purposeful link be-
tween Khatyn’ and Katyn.
44. Ritu Birla, “Postcolonial Studies: Now That’s History,” Can the Subaltern 
Speak? Refl ections on the History of an Idea, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2010), 88.
45. Helmut Lethen, Cool Conduct: The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 96.
46. For a paradigmatic example, see the feature fi lm Okkupatsia. Misteria, directed 
by Andrei Kudinenko (Navigator, 2003, 90 min.).
47. Valiantsin Akudovich, Kod otsutstviia. Osnovy belaruskai mental’nasti (Vilnius: 
Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Litovskoi respubliki, 2008), 69. For a similar use of the 
trope of “occupation” in contemporary Latvia, see Kevin M. F. Platt, “Okkupatsia vs. 
kolonizatsia: istoriia, postkolonial’nost’ i geografi cheskaia identichnost’. Sluchai Latvii,” 
Neprikosnovennyi zapas, no. 3 (2010), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2010/3/k5- pr.html.
48. Igar Babkov, “Etika pamezhzha. Transkulturnast ak bearuski dos’ved,” Frag-
menty, nos. 1–2 (1999): 75–88; Vladimir Abushenko, “Kreol’stvo kak ino- modernost 
vostochnoi Evropy,” Perekrestki, nos. 1–2 (2004): 124–56.
49. Elena Gapova, “On Nation, Gender, and Class Formation in Belarus . . . and 
Elsewhere in the Post- Soviet World,” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 4 (2002): 646–47.
50. On modes of validation, see Achille Mbembe, On the Postcoloniality (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2001), 17. The fi lm referenced is Pravda Khatyni (Belsat, 2008).
51. Akudovich, Kod otsutsviia, 71, 72.
52. Iadviga Uiferova, “Nas tak dolgo uchili liubit’ cheloveka s ruzh’em,” Izvestiia, 
February 29, 1996.
53. Dar’ia Sitnikova, “Partizan: Prikliucheniia odnogo konstepta v strane 
bol’shevikov,” Belorusskii format: nevidimaia real ’nost’, ed. Almira Ousmanova (Vil-
nius: Evropeiskii gumanitarnyi universitet, 2008), 433.
 serguei alex. oushakine
54. Gyan Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” American His-
torical Review 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1483.
55. Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Min-




59. Akudovich epitomized well this approach in the following description: “By 
taking part in the expansion of communism all over the world, Belarusians compen-
sated themselves for the lack of that supreme [vysokoi] Belarus (Great Lithuania) that 
they were deprived of by fate.” (Kod otsutstviia, 96.) For useful reviews of national 
debates in Belarus after 1991, see Gapova, “On Nation, Gender, and Class,” 639–62; 
Grigory Ioff e, Understanding Belarus and How Western Foreign Policy Misses the Mark 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2008).
60. Multiple scenarios of counterfactual history that try to “activate” alternative 
legacies and genealogies (mostly linked with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) are a 
perfect example of such informational excavations. For a discussion, see Nelly Bekus, 
Struggle over Identity: The Offi  cial and the Alternative “Belarussianness” (Budapest: 
CEU Press, 2010). For more on informational retrieval, see Rosalind C. Morris, in-
troduction to Can the Subaltern Speak? Refl ections, 2.
61. The journals Perekrestki and Fragmenty are the two main examples of this ap-
proach. See Andrei Dyn’ko, “Mezh bratskoi Rossiei i mirnoi Evropoi,” Perekrestki, 
nos. 1–2 (2006): 182–219; see also Aleksei Dzermant’s “Metaphizika ‘tuteishesti’,” 
and Oleg Breskii’s “Lokal’nost’,” Perekrestki, no. 1 (2008): 105–29, 130–49; Igar Bab-
kov, “Etika pamezhzha. Transkulturnast ak bearuski dos’ved,” and Adryian Melenik, 
“Belaruskaia ideia iak germafradytyzm natsyi: Z pavagai da teoryi, akaia lychila sat-
sialism khvarobai,” in Fragmenty, nos. 1–2 (1999): 75–88 and 235–45, respectively.
62. Following William of Ockham, Steven J. Livesey explains subalternation as a 
particular form of knowledge production in the following way: “Subalternation in the 
strict sense of occurs when a principle is known in one science and the conclusion in 
another.” William of Ockham, “The Subalternate Sciences, and Aristotle’s Theory of 
Metabasis,” British Journal for the History of Science 18, no. 2 ( July 1985): 141.
63. On the distinction of friend and enemy, see Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 36–37.
64. “Kuropaty: Mir pod sosnami,” Sovietskaia Belarus, October 29, 2009.
65. The pact of forgetting was a tacit collective agreement to avoid major public 
debates about the fascist past in the name of a peaceful transition toward democracy 
in post- Franco Spain. See Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Mili-
tary in the  Twentieth- Century Spain (London: Routledge, 1990).
66. Zianon Pazniak and Yauhen Shmyhalou, “Kurapaty—doroga smerti,” Litaratura 
i mastastva, no. 23 ( June 3, 1988). For an English translation, see Kurapaty, ed. Pazniak, 
Shmyhalou, M. Kryval’tsevich, and A. Iov (Minsk: Tekhnalogia, 1994), 78–92.
67. Zianon Pazniak, “Kuropaty. Dzdesiats gadov pas’lia,” Nasha Niva, no.12 (1998).
68. Pazniak and Shmyhalou, “Kuropaty—The Road of Death,” 90. See also Pazniak 
Zianon, “Astiarozhna, ‘Stalinism!,’” Litaratura i mastastva, no. 33 (August 19, 1991).
69. Pazniak and Shmyhalou, “Kuropaty—The Road of Death.” For a detailed dis-
cussion, see David R. Marples, “Kuropaty: The Investigation of a Stalinist Historical 
Controversy,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 513–23.
postcolonial estrangements 
70. As quoted in Igor Kuznetsov, “Zabyt’ znachit predat’,” Belorusskaia delovaia 
gazeta, April 16, 2004.
71. Kuznetsov, “Zabyt’ znachit predat’,” 12. See also Georgii Tarnavskii, Valerii So-
bolev, and Evgenii Gorelik, Kuropaty: sledstvie prodolzhaetsia (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia 
litereatura, 1990), 196–97.
72. Tarnavski et al., Kuropaty: sledstvie prodolzhaetsia, 44, 160.
73. Ibid., 262.
74. Anatol’ Viarstinski, “Kurapaty: tsiazhkaia daroga da praudy,” Litaratura i mas-
tastva, July 5, 1998.
75. For recent testimonies and  photo- documents, see Vspomni Dziady 88, a web 
page created by Radio Freedom, http://www.svaboda.org/content/Article/1331330
.html.
76. Sergei Pul’sha, “Kuropaty—aposhniaia pesnia,” Belarus maladezhznaia, No-
vember 16–25, 2001.
77. Anatol’ Viarstinski, “Akim byt’ pomniku v Kurapatakh,” Litaratura i mastastva, 
December 3, 1989.
78. “Zaiava gramadzkoi initsyatyvy ‘Za vratavan’ne memaryialy Kurapaty’,” Nasha 
Niva, October 1, 2001; Dar’ia Mal’kovskaia, “Kurpaty ne mogut byt’ nicheinymi,” 
Narodnaia volia, July 23, 2003; Viktor Korbut, “Kuropatam sueta protivopokazana,” 
Sovetskaia Belarus, August 28, 2003.
79. Mikhail Pozniakov, “Ia—ochevidets, ia—zhivoi svidetel’,” Verchernii Minsk, 
August 2, 1991; Aleksandr Sanich, “Kuropaty: zhivoi svidetel’ tragedii priekhal iz 
Maikopa,” Belorusskaia niva, August 10, 1991; M. Pozniakov, “Budu srazhat’sia za 
pravdu o Kuropatakh,” Vo slavu Rodiny, August 16, 1991.
80. V. Kondrat’ev, “Kuropaty: prokuratura eshche raz podvertzhaet,” Svaboda, no. 
46 ( June 21, 1996).
81. For more on the use of the language of genocide for building national identi-
ties, see James von Geldern’s essay in this volume.
82. Valentin Korzun, “Kto i v kogo strelial v Kuropatakh,” Sem’ dnei, November 24, 
2001; V. Korzun, “Pora skazat’ pravdu,” Belaia Rus’, July 1, 1994; V. Korzun “Esche 
raz o Kuropatakh: Fakty protestuiut,” Tovarishch, no. 20 (May 19, 1995). See also 
A. Zalesskii, “Delo o Kuropatakh: I vse- taki fashisty,” Tovarishch, no. 3 ( January 19, 
1996); Ivan Zagorodniuk, “Kuropaty: Istina vsegda odna,” Minskaia Pravda, Decem-
ber 15, 1994; Maria Osipova, “V dele o Kuropatakh tochku stavit’ rano,” Tovarishch, 
September 20, 1996.
83. Pazniak, “Kuropaty. Dzdesiats gadov pas’lia.”
84. Zianon Pazniak, “Biazvinnaia krov ne znikae biassledna,” Belaruskaia mala-
dezh, no. 7 (1994).
85. Svetlana Klimentsenka, “Kurapastkiia tsulpany,” Narodnaia volia, May 21, 2004.
86. For a brief discussion of the history of the Kuropaty monumentalization, 
see Valiantsina Trygubovich, “Narodnaia memarializatsya,” Kurapaty: Zbornik ma-
teryialov (Minsk: Hramadskaia initsyiatyva “Za ŭratavanne memaryi ͡alu Kurapaty,” 
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